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RESPONSE
DISCIPLINE AND NOURISH:
ON CONSTRUCTING COMMONS
Wendy J. Gordont
Scholarship has examined many possible ways to encourage the
creation and dissemination of art, works of authorship, ideas, and in-
ventions: rights of exclusion (copyrights and patents), prizes, govern-
mental subsidies, private subsidies (including both foundations and
patronage), reputation, and so forth. Legal scholars have long recog-
nized that copyright and patent are not the only options.' And while
some legal academics have mentioned the possibility of groups of
users and creators interacting on a voluntary2 but structured basis,3
legal scholars did not give much sustained attention to such possibili-
ties until fairly recently.
Historically, reference to self-help was rather limited and often
confined to examining how, in the absence of exclusion rights, an
entrepreneur or creator might benefit from lead-time advantage, 4 cus-
tomer loyalty, secrecy, or retaliatory strike editions5 to gain an advan-
tage over competitors. Then there was a revolution. Self-help
increasingly became identified not only with individual profit seeking
but also with groups dedicated to cooperative creation.
t" Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I wish to thank
the participants at the BU Faculty Workshop as well as Stacey Dogan, Brett Frischmann,
Jessica Litman, Gregg Macey, Mike Meurer, and Elizabeth Nowicki for yery helpful com-
ments. I also thank Todd Marabella, Jennifer Yoon, and the BU Pappas Law Library staff
for excellent research assistance. © 2010 by WendyJ. Gordon.
1 For example, consider one locus classicus in an article on copyright by then-Profes-
sor, now-Justice Stephen Breyer: "It would be possible, for instance, to do without copy-
right, relying upon authors, publishers, and buyers to work out arrangements among
themselves that would provide books' creators with enough money to produce them." Ste-
phen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281, 282 (1970).
2 Justice Breyer mentions that "[i] n the nineteenth century American publishers sold
countless copies of British works and paid their authors royalties despite the fact that
American copyright law did not protect British works." Id. at 282-83.
3 See id. at 303 ("[Olne need only think of a professional association of physicists
using dues to support a physics journal, of a group of school districts jointly contracting for
the development of a textbook, or even of a book club that provides its members with
novels." (citation omitted)).
4 See id. at 299-301 (discussing the benefit of the lead-time advantage in publishing).
5 Historically, publishers had the ability to punish copiers by producing "punitive
'fighting editions,' which they would sell below the copier's cost." Id. at 300.
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In 1979, Lewis Hyde described behavior exhibited by ideal artistic
communities 6 whose members interacted in part by giving and recip-
rocating creativity. Hyde saw this behavior as a kind of gift exchange.
At midcentury, Robert Merton explored similar norms of sharing
among scientists. 7 Then the sharing models exemplified by these rai-
fied groups exploded into new areas.8 Notably, cooperative behavior
became the everyday experience of a multitude of ordinary techies
who in their peer communities did everything from repairing flawed
computer code to counting Mars craters. 9 And structures evolved-
notably, the General Public License and "copyleft,"10 the Creative
Commons,"' and fair-use guidelines with true creator input' 2-that
made cooperation and sharing easier.
In Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment (CCCE),
Michael Madison, Brett Frischmann, and Katherine Strandburg make
clear that this new mode of organizing human effort deserves a main-
stream place on the agenda. 13 Their valuable article is of course more
than an announcement that constructed commons have come of age;
it provides a preliminary framework helpful in developing new com-
6 See generally LEwis HYDE, THE GIFT: CREATMTY AND THE ARTIST IN THE MODERN
WORLD (Vintage Books 2d ed. 2007) (1979) (describing creativity exchange among artists).
7 See ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 336-37 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973) (describing sharing among
scientists).
8 The scientists' own norms also began changing, caused, among other things, by the
incursion of patent into the academy. These changes, touched on in another piece by
Michael Madison, Brett Frischmann, and Katherine Strandburg, is outside the scope of this
Response. See generally Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J.
Strandburg, The University as Constructed Cultural Commons, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 365
(2009) [hereinafter Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, University as Commons].
9 See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369, 374 (2002) (discussing the emergence of such cooperative behaviors and
their dynamics).
10 Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License (June 29, 2007), http://
www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html. For a description of "copyleft," see infra note 51 and ac-
companying text.
1 Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
12 American University School of Communication, Center for Social Media, Fair Use
& Copyright, http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/fair-use (last visitedJan. 26,
2010). These new guidelines provide a realistic framework in which the makers and insur-
ers of documentary films do not need to clear every accidentally recorded bit of back-
ground music with the copyright owner.
Note that there are two commons here. One commons is the public domain of fair
use, which preexisted the guidelines. Another commons is the guidelines themselves,
which make the fair use doctrine more understandable and usable; the guidelines are a
public good, freely usable by the relevant communities and produced as ajoint effort. See
generally CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, Am. UNIV. SCH. OF COMMC'N, DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS'
STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE (2005), http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/
files/pdf/fair-use-final.pdf (outlining what filmmakers regard as a reasonable application
of the fair use doctrine).
13 MichaelJ. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing
Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 657 (2010).
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mons and for improving the function of existing commons. What the
CCCE authors call a "constructed cultural commons" is one of many
forms of sharing; roughly speaking, a constructed commons is a more
or less deliberate attempt to coordinate group production of knowl-
edge by some mode of self-imposed governance. The CCCE authors'
definition of "commons," however, is open-ended.1 4
This open-endedness means that "constructed commons" can
blend into other institutions. For example, consider the relation be-
tween constructed commons and gifts. Although sometimes gifts can
be boundaryless and obligation free, often times gifts have specific
destinations, and obligations of reciprocity are enforced informally
but stringently. 15 At other points, the constructed commons resemble
firms, which allow sharing among their members (employees) and
employ governance. On yet other occasions, a constructed commons
can function like the public domain. 16
I will not pursue these definitional ambiguities' 7 in this Response.
Rather, I will single out a particular aspect of the CCCE article to
discuss.
14 Madison, Frischmann, and Strandburg define a "commons" as "a managed-access
property regime." Id. at 659; see also id. at 694 ("Commons regimes are defined both by the
degree of openness and control that they exhibit with respect to contributors, users, and re-
sources, and by the assignment of control, or custody of the power to administer access."); id. at 699
("A commons is a rhetorically open place."). The authors also articulated that a "com-
mons is not a singular concept," and that "[c]ommons have multiple levels, sources, and
products." Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, University as Commons, supra note 8, at 366;
see also id. at 372 ("Commons serves as a metaphor for an environment defined by re-
sources that can be contributed and appropriated by some population of creators and
consumers (often, these are the same actors), operating according to some specified de-
gree of openness."); id. ("Commons are constructed by human actors and institutions, act-
ing intentionally."); id. at 373 ("Commons are distinguished and distinguishable from the
environment around them.... Commons are managed by some population of insiders.
In both senses, [Elinor Ostrom] recognizes that commons are not simply given. Commons
are created or constructed."); id. at 374-75 ("Commons are built from intentional human
activity."); id. at 375 ("Commons consist in the first place of some pool of resources.").
The authors also specify that " [a] mong other things, commons typically have membership
criteria (specifying who may contribute to and appropriate resources from the commons);
resource contribution and appropriation standards; decision-making rules; and provisions
for resolving conflicts over membership and resources and sanctions for violations." Id. at
376.
15 See, e.g., MARCEL MAuss, THE Givr: THE FoRM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN
ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 3-4 (W.D. Halls trans., Routledge 1990) (1950); ANNETrE B. WEINER,
INALIENABLE POSSESSIONS: THE PARADOX OF KEEPING-WHILE-GIVING 17-18, 28-33 (1992);
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gifts, 46 UCLA L. REv. 815,
844-47 (1999).
16 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 13, at 695 ("It is entirely possi-
ble and desirable for a community to produce and/or manage a cluster of cultural goods
that is accessible to outsiders.").
17 For an excellent discussion of some of the definitional tasks that future work will
need to explicate, see Lawrence B. Solum, Questioning Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L.
REv. 817, 830-31 (2010).
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The CCCE authors aim to adapt the framework that Elinor Os-
trom and her colleagues originally developed to examine natural re-
source commons.' 8 CCCE aims to extend Ostrom's framework' 9 to
the cultural arena.20 The CCCE authors thus examine some important
distinctions between the domain of culture and Ostrom's domain of
natural resources. 21  They propose "adjustment[s] [to Ostrom's
framework] to account for differences between the natural environ-
ment and the cultural environment."22
Given that goal, at least one aspect of Ostrom's framework needs
more emphasis than it currently receives in the CCCE authors' work:
how to structure any particular commons to monitor and discipline its
members and to enforce its boundaries. Ostrom and the CCCE au-
thors call this aspect "sanctions"-a subset of "governance mecha-
nisms." 23 Sanctions and governance constitute an area where natural
resource management is particularly likely to differ from operations
in the cultural domain.
In the work likely to generate from the CCCE article, therefore,
greater emphasis should be given to the need for studying and design-
ing sanctions. This Response highlights three points arguing for such
an increased emphasis: (1) the need for sanctions even in the case of
nonrival resources, (2) the difficulty of crafting sanctions (whether re-
wards or punishments) for creative domains, and (3) the need for an
existing CCCE case study to employ greater detail and empirical data
to examine more fully the interplay between rewards and punish-
ments on the one hand and behavior on the other.
WHY SANCTION?
What often discourages participation in a constructed commons
is the fear of being exploited. People have a taste for not being a
taken for a sucker, a fool, a simpleton, a jerk, or a sap. They have
what one might call "sap aversion."24 They do not want their hard
18 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTI-
TUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (discussing commons in the context of natural
resource systems).
19 Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 13, at 659-60.
20 See id. at 665-66.
21 See id. at 683-84.
22 See id. at 666.
23 See id. passim. My concern is with the matter of emphasis; the CCCE authors cer-
tainly do recognize that sanctions are important. Thus, among the "relevant clusters or
'buckets' of variables that will be important to explore," the CCCE authors list "governance
mechanisms of the commons (membership rules, resource contribution or extraction stan-
dards and requirements, conflict resolution mechanisms, sanctions for rule violation)." Id.
at 698.
24 I treat various terms, such as sap, simpleton, and sucker, as interchangeable.
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work-or their contribution to a commons-to give them nothing
while others benefit from their restraint or their effort.
Sap aversion is easiest to see in the natural resource context. For
example, H. Scott Gordon wrote in 1954: "Wealth that is free for all is
valued by none because he who is foolhardy enough to wait for its proper
time of use will only find that it has been taken by another."2 5 Ostrom
makes a similar point; speaking of the danger that a user of common
water will breach the rotation schedule and take too much water, she
writes that "[n]o one wants to be a 'sucker,' keeping a promise that
everyone else is breaking."26 The fear of being taken for a sap or a
sucker is even clearer in Garrett Hardin's The Tragedy of the Commons.2 7
Hardin's primary concern in that article was population con-
trol.28 He suggested that what discourages participation in voluntary
limits on family size is the feeling not only that the participator will
deny himself or herself the benefit of multiple progeny, but also that the
participator's very self-restraint will be mocked by the way the rest of
the world takes advantage of the participator's sacrifice but makes no
sacrifice in return. Hardin stated:
If we ask a man who is exploiting a commons to desist "in the name
of conscience," what are we saying to him? What does he hear?-
not only at the moment but also in the wee small hours of the night when,
half asleep, he remembers not merely the words we used but also
the nonverbal communication cues we gave him unawares? Sooner
or later, consciously or subconsciously, he senses that he has re-
ceived two communications, and that they are contradictory: (i) (in-
tended communication) "If you don't do as we ask, we will openly
condemn you for not acting like a responsible citizen"; (ii) (the un-
intended communication) "If you do behave as we ask, we will secretly
condemn you for a simpleton who can be shamed into standing aside
while the rest of us exploit the commons. "29
25 H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J.
POL. ECON. 124, 135 (1954) (emphasis added); see OSTROM, supra note 18, at 3 (quoting
Gordon, supra).
26 See OSTROM, supra note 18, at 44.
27 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
28 See id. at 1243.
29 Id. at 1246 (first and third emphases added). Although here I follow the usual
practice of examining how sap aversion can inhibit cooperation, Ernst Fehr and Simon
Gachter's experiments remind us that "a strong aversion against being the 'sucker' in so-
cial dilemma situations" can also be a motivational resource from which cooperation-en-
hancing punishment can emerge. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gdchter, Cooperation and
Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 980, 980 (2000) (testing whether
such an aversion will result in less free riding). Fehr and Gachter "deliberately designed
[their] experiments... to examine whether people punish free-riders even if it is against
their material self-interest." Id. at 981. For a brief discussion on sap aversion as a motiva-
tional resource that can help commons flourish, see infra notes 62-63 and accompanying
text.
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As Ostrom makes clear and the CCCE authors also acknowledge,
in order to sustain many commons, sanctions often will be essential to
avoid overuse, undercontribution, and promise breaking.30 In other
words, cooperation is a good thing if others cooperate, and partici-
pants need some assurance that when it is their turn to kick, others
will not pull the ball away.
Compared to the context of natural resources, it is sometimes
harder to see the need for sanctions for cultural goods, whose prod-
ucts are nonrival (inexhaustible). 31 Because thousands of people can
enjoy a nonrival song or invention simultaneously (it might be ar-
gued), everyone can employ the good and no one need feel like a sap.
The argument might alternatively go as follows: We do not need sanc-
tions for knowledge commons. The public domain functions without
sanctions. 32 Why do we need the complication of a constructed com-
mons with carefully designed sanctions? An example might help an-
swer the question.
Imagine that a newly graduated PhD is deciding whether to enter
into business or academia. The young academic prefers the latter op-
tion but learns about tenure being denied on arbitrary bases and of
excellent scholars being turned into itinerant adjuncts without health
benefits and with so many classes to teach that they lack time to write.
Unless the young academic has some assurance that his or her hard
work and talent will be rewarded, he or she may choose not to partici-
pate in the common academic enterprise. If the young scholar could
be more sure of the merit basis of universities' sanction decisions, he
or she might be more likely to choose academia. The young academic
does not want to spend years generating scholarship on which he or
she later will lack the time and resources to build; the young academic
does not want to be a sucker. The nature and reliability of appropri-
ate sanctions may be crucial.
3o See OSTROM, supra note 18; Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 13.
31 Nonrivalry is one characteristic of the phenomenon known as a "public good."
Economists tend to treat nonrivalry as a "problem"-a technical analytic problem-be-
cause it does not fit their neoclassical private-goods models. In the real world, nonrivalry is
of course an immense source of wealth. See generally Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and
Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 810 (2009) (coining and defining the
phrase "leveraging nonrivalry" (emphasis omitted)); Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg,
supra note 13, at 695 n.141 (discussing nonrivalry). Unfortunately, too many copyright
scholars borrow the economists' nomenclature and speak of the "public-good problem"
when the public-good characteristic of intangibles is not a "problem" but instead is a won-
derful asset.
32 Ironically, of course, the last few decades have seen arguments that the public do-
main also is being used in ways that make some people into saps. See Anupam Chander &
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1335 (2004) (argu-
ing that "the public domain has been a source for exploiting the labor and bodies of the
disempowered").
[Vol. 95:733
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In short, nonrivalry (of the young scholar's knowledge) does not
assure immunity from becoming a sucker. Although it is appropriate
to focus on nonrivalry (inexhaustibility) as a base for optimism about
the chance for the success of cultural commons, there are limits to
nonrivalry. The resources that generate the initial instantiation of an
artwork or an invention are exhaustible. Furthermore, the possibility
of physical co-use does not eliminate the possibility of an originating
donor monetarily, emotionally, or practically losing the ability to use
what he or she helped to create. If the possibility of being made a sap
is less present in constructed knowledge commons than in other areas,
the possibility is nevertheless far from absent.
One risk of being a sap is exclusion both from the work of the
commons and from (the value of) one's own work. Another risk is
undertaking work to serve a particular purpose and to find that work
turned against one's own goals. Yet another risk is of outsiders taking
the work of the commons or of an individual and privatizing it. The
CCCE authors mention the danger of privatization, 3 and that topic is
worth further explication in the context of sap aversion and the need
for sanctions.
AN EXTENDED EXAMPLE: SANCTIONS AND BEING A SAP
To illustrate the privatization danger, its relation to being a sap,
and methods of avoiding becoming a sucker, consider the free-
software movement. Richard Stallman, its founder, wanted software
users to have the freedom to copy, adapt, and redistribute software.3 4
How could Stallman accomplish his goals?
At first it might seem logical that someone desiring to share his
software would put it into the public domain. But though that
software would be free, it also would be vulnerable. If Stallman had
put his code into the public domain, it is true that downstream users
would be able to access it, adapt it, improve it, and use it. But given
the way that copyright law functions, copyright law could have allowed
third parties to co-opt the code.35 That is, its public-spirited author
could have been made into a sap. Below is a discussion of how the law
33 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 13, at 692 ("In some of these
cases, a commons is constructed as a defense against potential privatization of commonly
useful resources.").
34 See RicHARD M. STALLMAN, The GNU Project, in FREE SorrwARE, FREE SOCIETY: SE-
LECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 15, 17 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002) [hereinafter STALL-
MAN, The GNU Project]. For a discussion of the importance of access to the source code to
achieve certain freedoms for users, see RIcHARD M. STALLMAN, Free Software Definition, in
FREE SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY. SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN, supra, at 41, 41.
35 STALLMAN, The GNU Project, supra note 34, at 20-21 (noting that "anyone can make
a proprietary modified version" of public-domain software).
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might have responded to the software author's (the hypothetical Stall-
man's) actions.
The initial source code would be copyrightable as a "[1]iterary
work[ ].-36 Ordinarily, that copyright would last for well over one
hundred years. 37 If the software author later injected the code into
the public domain, however, the copyright would have terminated
completely. At that point, the code would have been unowned and
anyone could use it.
If someone makes use of a public-domain work to make a new
work-for example, if someone translates Ovid into English or makes
a new movie of William Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet-the person
making the adaptation receives a copyright in his or her "derivative
work," and the copyright extends to whatever expression is original
with (not copied by) the maker of the derivative work.38 Others can-
not copy the translation or the film but can go back to the original
Ovid or Shakespeare.
Sometimes, however, there is a danger that the copyrighted deriv-
ative work will make it harder to utilize the public-domain originals. If
software is donated to the public domain or placed on an unlimited
license to use, a proprietary firm can take the software and so alter,
distribute, and advertise the altered version that people will use only
the altered proprietary version and not the free-software version. This
danger described above will make it harder in turn for those persons
who want to use the free-software versions to communicate with per-
sons using the proprietary versions.
Copyright law embodies some protection against the danger of
derivative works blocking off the public domain in this way. In the
famous case of L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,39 an entrepreneur
named Jeffrey Snyder created a plastic replica of a metal public-do-
main Uncle Sam bank.40 The court was concerned that the copyright
in one plastic version of the bank might discourage the making of all
new versions of the nineteenth-century original.41
36 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "[I] iterary works"); id. § 102(a) (extending copy-
right protection to original "works of authorship" and including "literary works" as a cate-
gory within "works of authorship"); id. § 117 (outlining the limitations on exclusive rights
with respect to computer programs).
37 In the United States today, the copyright duration for those post-1978 works that
are not created as works-for-hire is life of the author plus seventy years. Id. § 302(a).
38 Id. § 101 (defining "derivative work"); see id. § 103(a) (extending the subject matter
of copyright in § 102 to include derivative works); id. § 103(b) (limiting such copyright
only to the material contributed by the author of such derivative work).
39 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
40 The banks, made of metal, were popular in the nineteenth century. A child who
wants to save his penny puts a coin in Uncle Sam's carpetbag.
41 Bailin, 536 F.2d at 488.
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Snyder had a plastic replica of the bank made in Hong Kong and,
by registering his copyright in this derivative work, he was able to have
the United States Customs Service block similar plastic banks from
entering the country. 42 The problem, of course, is that most versions
of a nineteenth-century, public-domain Uncle Sam bank will look very
similar to each other. Indeed, the Customs Service eventually blocked
a plastic bank from entry into the country that may have been made
completely without reference to Snyder's copyrighted plastic bank.
When the importer of that second plastic bank sought to enjoin
the Customs Service from enforcing Snyder's copyright, 43 the court
had essentially two choices: First, the court could have conducted a
fact-intensive inquiry into infringement-in particular, into the ques-
tion of whether the maker of the second plastic bank had copied to a
significant degree any of the features of the first plastic bank that were
original to that first bank. Second, the court could deny the first
plastic-bank maker (Snyder) any copyright in his plastic replica.
If the court had chosen the first (infringement) option, the
holder of the copyright in the initial plastic bank (a derivative work
built on a public-domain model) would have been given a potentially
powerful "weapon for harassment. '44 Since questions of "who copied
what" are very fact intensive, they are expensive and time consuming.
I doubt the profit margins on second or third plastic banks would be
large enough for importers to be willing to incur extensive delay and
litigation. The result? The owner of the copyright in the first deriva-
tive work could have an effective monopoly on all plastic versions of
the once-popular original metal bank. That is, Snyder would have an
effective monopoly not only on plastic versions of the bank that cop-
ied his particular small changes, but also (possibly) on any plastic ver-
sion of the public-domain bank.
The court in Batlin was sensitive to these above-mentioned con-
cerns45 and avoided the factual inquiry into copying. Instead, the
court held that Snyder's plastic bank did not show enough originality
to merit copyright as a derivative work.46
Arguably, the court manipulated the standard of what counts as
original enough to obtain a copyright 47 to secure the public's freedom
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 492.
45 See id. ("To extend copyrightability to minuscule variations would simply put a
weapon for harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and
monopolizing public domain work.").
46 Id.
47 See id. at 492-93 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (arguing that Snyder's version was more
than a trivial variation and thus met the "modest level of originality" necessary to be eligi-
ble for a copyright); see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
In Feist, the Court explained:
2010]
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to copy the public-domain bank. Would such an escape hatch have
been available if, for example, a commercial entity created an im-
proved version of the above-mentioned hypothetical public-domain
version of a Stallman program?48 Almost certainly not: Batlin has its
limits49 and probably would not extend to making extensive changes
to a program incapable of copyright.
[T]he originality requirement is not particularly stringent. A compiler may
settle upon a selection or arrangement that others have used; novelty is not
required. Originality requires only that the author make the selection or
arrangement independently ([i.e.], without copying that selection or ar-
rangement from another work), and that it display some minimal level of
creativity. Presumably, the vast majority of compilations will pass this test,
but not all will. There remains a narrow category of works in which the
creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent.
Id. at 358-59.
48 It is not even clear that such an escape hatch should be available. The copyright
statute does not on its face apply different standards of originality to different types of
work, and it can be dangerous to play with the standards.
In at least one case, a court eager to deprive a derivative-work maker of a copyright
twisted the standard of copyrightability out of all recognition. In that case, the Seventh
Circuit denied copyright to a hand-painted and individually composed painting that took
the trained artist over forty hours of work to complete. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698
F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Telephone Interview with Jorie Gracen, Artist (Aug.
2009) (providing information about the number of hours spent on the work). The court
held that the painting was insufficiently original to sustain a copyright. Id. Its purpose in
doing so largely was to safeguard the interests of the owner of the copyright in the film that
the artist used (with the owner's permission) as her source. See id. The painting should
have been copyrightable under any rational standard yet was held incapable of copyright
on the ground that it lacked sufficient originality. The Seventh Circuit has since repudi-
ated this aspect of Gracen. SeeSchrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th
Cir. 2009). For more examination of pre-Schrock developments, see Wendy J. Gordon &
Boris Milman, Derivative Rights and the Rule of Law:Judge Posner and Copyright (draft on file
with author).
Some courts still require heightened amounts of originality to copyright derivative
works. Ironically, such courts tend to be more willing to deny copyright to derivative works
for the purpose of protecting prior copyright owners (whom one would think would able
to take care of themselves via contract) than for the purpose of protecting the public do-
main. See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (indicat-
ing that derivative works based on public-domain works were more easily copyrighted than
derivative works based on copyrighted works); Entm't Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Cre-
ative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1220-24 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing the importance of
not allowing derivative-work copyrights to arise if they might impair the abilities of the
owners of copyrights to exploit the works on which the derivatives were based).
49 See supra note 48. In Schrock, the Seventh Circuit (perhaps in a mere pendulum
swing after Gracen) construed Batlin not to impose higher standards for copyrighting a
derivative work. Discussing Gracen's use of Batlin, the Seventh Circuit wrote:
Read in context.... the cited language from L. Batlin did not suggest that a
heightened standard of originality applies to derivative works. To the con-
trary, the Second Circuit said only that to be copyrightable a work must
"'contain some substantial, not merely trivial originality.'" The court ex-
plained that for derivative works, as for any other work, "[t ] he test of origi-
nality is concededly one with a low threshold in that all that is needed is
that the author contributed something more than a merely trivial variation,
something recognizably his own."
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It is quite possible for the adapter of an excellent existing pro-
gram to make original alterations and additions to the program. Let
us assume some commercial entity decided to invest its programmers'
time into making such a version of a public-domain work. The pro-
grammers add some truly valuable bells and whistles. Extreme eleva-
tions of the copyrightability standard are unlikely; so the commercial
entity most probably would obtain a copyright in what its derivative
work added to the original program.
The commercial firm then could bombard the information-tech-
nology world with advertising for the "new" program and with supple-
mental programs that the company created to interact with the "new"
portions of its program. Conceivably, the company's derivative work
quickly could swamp the public's use of the public-domain core of the
program. And if the commercial entity wanted to restrict access and
use of its proprietary program (say, by using copyright law aggressively
and by distributing only hard-to-adapt object code), there might be
nothing the hypothetical Stallman could do about it. The hypotheti-
cal Stallman would be in the role of "sap"-he would have done a lot
of work that, in the end, served to hurt his cause.
To avoid such problems, the real-life Stallman invented
"copyleft," which he describes as "a method of ensuring that all copies
of all versions of a given work come with freedom."50 A copyleft li-
cense says (in simplified form) the following: I claim my copyright.
My computer program is not in the public domain. I consent to you
utilizing my program in any way that you wish-you can sell it, adapt
it, and use it-so long as you comply with two conditions. First, you
must accompany anything you produce with the human-readable
source code (as opposed to largely unintelligible object code). Sec-
ond, you must put a license just like this one on what you produce or
distribute. If you violate either of these conditions, I will sue you for
copyright infringement. 51
Schrock, 586 F.3d at 520-21 (alteration to quoted text in original) (citations omitted) (foot-
note omitted) (quoting Balin, 536 F.2d at 490).
50 Telephone Interview with Richard Stallman, Founder, The GNU Project (Mar. 27,
2010). For a further description of "copyleft," see infra note 51 and accompanying text.
51 Here is some language from the current version of the GNU General Public
License:
4. Conveying Verbatim Copies.
You may convey verbatim copies of the Program's source code as you re-
ceive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously and appropriately
publish on each copy an appropriate copyright notice; keep intact all no-
tices stating that this License and any non-permissive terms added in accord
with section 7 apply to the code; keep intact all notices of the absence of
any warranty; and give all recipients a copy of this License along with the
Program.
You may charge any price or no price for each copy that you convey, and
you may offer support or warranty protection for a fee.
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People who copy a copyrighted work in excess of permission are
usually infringers, and "protection for a work employing preexisting
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the
work in which such material has been used unlawfully."52 Copyleft
thus prevents the free grantors of programming from having their
work privatized by others. Authors who employ copyleft licenses can
participate in a common without becoming fools (H. Scott Gordon's
word), simpletons (Hardin's epithet), or suckers (Ostrom's term).
As the CCCE authors note, the end result is that the members of
the GNU collective give each other immense benefits in terms of ad-
aptation, documentation, debugging, and other growths and improve-
ments of the programs. 5 3 The ability to enforce is key.54
So sanctions need to play a role in at least some knowledge com-
mons. Later in this Response, I will address some of the difficulties in
formulating appropriate sanctions in areas other than copyleft. But
first, consider this discussion:
5. Conveying Modified Source Versions.
You may convey a work based on the Program, or the modifications to pro-
duce it from the Program, in the form of source code under the terms of
section 4, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:
a) The work must carry prominent notices stating that you modified it, and
giving a relevant date.
b) The work must carry prominent notices stating that it is released under
this License and any conditions added under section 7. This requirement
modifies the requirement in section 4 to "keep intact all notices".
c) You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this License to any-
one who comes into possession of a copy. This License will therefore apply,
along with any applicable section 7 additional terms, to the whole of the
work, and all its parts, regardless of how they are packaged. This License
gives no permission to license the work in any other way, but it does not
invalidate such permission if you have separately received it.
d) If the work has interactive user interfaces, each must display Appropriate
Legal Notices; however, if the Program has interactive interfaces that do
not display Appropriate Legal Notices, your work need not make them do
so....
6. Conveying Non-Source Forms.
You may convey a covered work in object code form under the terms of
sections 4 and 5, provided that you also convey the machine-readable Cor-
responding Source under the terms of this License ....
Free Software Foundation, supra note 10.
52 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
53 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 13, at 703-04.
54 See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforce-
ment of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L.
Ruv. 271, 328 (2007) ("Courts should facilitate the growth of a semicommons of creative
works by giving appropriate legal recognition to both the private and public rights that
exist in works released pursuant to a Creative Commons license. By doing so, courts will
enhance the ultimate goal of copyright: promoting knowledge and learning."). The Fed-
eral Circuit recently enforced a copyleft license in Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373,
1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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Is copyleft impermeable, so that persons who fail to comply with
the license terms are prohibited fully from copying anything from the
copylefted program? The answer is no: even people who reject the
copyleft license terms will be able to copy some things in the
copylefted program. Copyright law creates gaps in any ownership
boundary. Notably, a copyright owner cannot own the ideas, methods
of operation, or facts in his or her creation. Much of the content in a
computer program cannot be owned under current copyright law. 55
Even some content that can be owned is open to fair use.56
Are these gaps wise from a policy perspective? My first instinct is
that the gaps in copyright also make sense for copyleft; the First
Amendment, copyright and patent policy,5 7 some human rights docu-
ments, 58 and at least some versions of a "natural rights" view of copy-
right entitlements59 all mandate a public liberty of access and use for
some created content. Yet I must admit that the issues faced in the
context of copyleft are somewhat different than the issues faced in
standard copyright. To the extent that efforts against privatization are
permeable, they have gaps that reintroduce the possibility of someone
becoming a sap and of sap aversion undermining cooperation.
I do not mean to indicate that members of constructed commons
would want such impermeability; to the contrary, for example, the cur-
rent free-software license embraces fair use.60 Instead, I want to point
out that permeability adds an additional complication to the question
of how to avoid being a sap without unduly sacrificing other goals.
55 See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995),
affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992). I place outside my discussion the potential impact
of patent law.
56 17 U.S.C. § 107. The GNU General Public License is explicit in its openness to fair
use. Thus, the third version provides: "All rights granted under this License are granted
for the term of copyright on the Program, and are irrevocable provided the stated condi-
tions are met.... This License acknowledges your rights of fair use or other equivalent, as
provided by copyright law." Free Software Foundation, supra note 10.
57 See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)
(discussing patent policy).
58 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) ("Everyone has the right
freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits.").
59 I have argued that such a public entitlement to access and use of the cultural heri-
tage is embedded in the best reading of John Locke's theory of property. See WendyJ.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540-44 (1993). An analogous common law-based
analysis could also provide the public with access and use rights because cultural artifacts
change the position of recipients in ways that should entitle them to respond. See, e.g.,
WendyJ. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHj. L.
REv. 75, 78 (2004) [hereinafter Gordon, Render Copyright].
60 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. Admittedly, it is unlikely that a profit-
making proprietary user could gain shelter from the doctrine.
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To study a commons, we need to keep a focus on the boundaries
that separate commons from the open fields of the public domain or
the fortified castles of private property. Boundaries are permeable,
and they inevitably contain gaps of varying sizes and causes. Nonpar-
ticipation can result from a fear of falling through the gaps (sap aver-
sion), and this fear motivates people in different ways. Gaps and
responses to gaps in part shape how commons are constructed. The
CCCE authors' framework would be improved by clarifying their inter-
est in boundaries to account for these dynamics. 61
THE POSITIVE SIDE OF SAP AvERSION
The fear of becoming a sap can deter joining or contributing to a
commons, but the hatred of having been treated like a sap can provide
useful energy and motivation for the enforcement of sanctions. So
the news about sap aversion is not all bad: "a strong aversion against
being the 'sucker' in social dilemma situations"62 can be a motiva-
tional resource from which cooperation-enhancing punishment can
emerge. This is one of the lessons that can be learned from behav-
ioral economics, including from the work of Ernst Fehr.63
There can be many components in the willingness to punish
when one is made to feel like a sucker, including an aversion to ineq-
uity, a preference for reciprocity, and spite or revenge. 64 (There also
can be reputational benefits and pride in the act of punishing defec-
tors, as Ostrom points out regarding the benefits of monitoring.) 65
What is important to note is that the same sap aversion preference
patterns that can interfere with the operation of commons can also be
harnessed to help the commons succeed. Examination of this phenome-
non-and analysis of how to harness sap aversion properly-belongs
near the center of future work on constructed commons.
61 I am indebted here to Gregg Macey.
62 Fehr & Gdchter, supra note 29, at 980.
63 See id. at 980, 987 (discussing that people "may be willing to punish free-riding,
even if this is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their
punishment activities"). The article also discusses that such punishment helps elevate
levels of cooperation even among selfish subjects. See id. passim.
64 Cf Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Why Social Preferences Matter-The Impact of Non-
Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives, 112 ECON. J. (CONFERENCE PAPERS)
Cl, C2-4 (2002) (distinguishing among differing social preferences, such as reciprocity,
inequity aversion, pure altruism, and spite or envy).
65 Ostrom notes that "[t]he individual who finds a rule-infractor gains status and pres-
tige for being a good protector of the commons." OSTROM, supra note 18, at 96. She also
argues that "[e]ven though it is frequently presumed that participants will not spend the
time and effort to monitor and sanction each other's performances, substantial evidence
has been presented that they do both in these settings." Id. at 94.
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GOVERNANCE AND SANCTIONS IN CREATIVE DOMAINS
We already know that discipline can be crucial in maintaining a
commons. 66 For example, we know from game theory that some pay-
off structures can result in self-defeating or otherwise suboptimal be-
havior.67 Experiments by Fehr and others show that some public-
goods and gift models may fail to sustain a level of cooperation unless
the models build in the power to punish noncooperators after their
norm breaking is known.68 It can be the possibility of punishing,
along with reputational benefits, that enables reciprocating people-
the people on whose behavior the Humean model of cooperation by
convention is built 69-to harness the efforts of selfish people. With-
out the ability to punish and reward, a group may generate a seriously
suboptimal amount of a public good. 70
As mentioned, this concern is not obviated by the potential inex-
haustibility of cultural products. Although intangible products like in-
ventions and artwork are nonrival, the human and physical resources
66 This is a dominant concern of Ostrom, the Nobel laureate on whose work the
CCCE article creatively builds. See generally id. at 88-102, 185-92 (providing an analysis of
long-enduring commons and of rule following).
67 Bad results are not inevitable. Sometimes coordination results from a naturally
benign payoff system. For example, a rowboat will go in circles unless a rower on each side
employs effort. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. 3, pt. 2, § 2, at
490 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1740) ("Two men, who pull
the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given
promises to each other.") (I am indebted to Aaron Garrett for pointing out this example).
Furthermore, sometimes a natural system can be restructured to induce cooperative behav-
ior by fairly small but significant design choices. Henry Smith's research in the practices of
medieval landowners illustrates this principle. See Henry E. Smith, Senicommon Property
Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 147-48 (2000). Smith looked
at the ways a particular semicommons (in land used commonly for grazing and privately
for grain growing) discouraged strategic behavior. Grazing provided benefits in the form
of manure and harms in the form of trampled soil. To prevent individual landowners from
strategically driving livestock towards or away from their lands, property was divided into
thin strips and scattered throughout the semicommons. Under this system, although all
landowners could identify their scattered strips of land during harvest, they or their agents
would have difficulty determining which scattered strip was which "at the tempo of milling
sheep." See id. at 147. The scattering of the plots made nonstrategic behavior largely self-
enforcing.
68 See Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 64, at C17-20; see also Fehr & Gftchter, supra
note 29, at 988-90 (documenting experiments where "full cooperation emerges as the
dominant behavioral standard" when punishment was an option but where, "in the ab-
sence of punishment opportunities[,] full free-riding is the focal action"). For a vivid
graphical representation of the potential importance of punishment, see Fehr &
Fischbacher, supra note 64, at C19 fig. 4.
69 See HUME, supra note 67, bk. 3, pt. 2, §§ 2-3, at 484-513. (discussing the role of
convention).
70 See generally Fehr & Gdchter, supra note 29 (providing experimental evidence to
demonstrate an increase in cooperation attributable to the availability and use of punish-
ment). Note that although Fehr and Gachter suggest that "the presence of punishment
opportunities eventually leads to pecuniary efficiency gains," this finding is less robust than
their findings on the increase of cooperation. See id. at 993.
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used in these products are scarce. Therefore, incentives may be nec-
essary to ensure productivity. This insight about incentives largely
drives conventional property-right solutions, such as copyright and
patent, and plays a role as well in the CCCE project.
Yet we know that incentives, particularly in creative domains, do
not work in a straightforward manner. It is crucial for persons in-
spired by the CCCE article to place the difficulties of incentives near
the centers of their respective case studies.
Designing appropriate sanctions is likely to be more difficult for
creative contexts than for natural resource contexts. Many of the suc-
cessful commons studied by Ostrom were able to utilize objective mea-
surements of resource use and contribution and had simple methods
of monitoring compliance. For example, a farmer is entitled to a speci-
fied number of hours of opening the gate to allow water from the com-
mon canal to irrigate his field; he is obligated to spend a specified
number of hours maintaining and repairing the canal earthworks, and
other farmers may be present at both occasions to make monitoring
easy, unobtrusive, and natural. 71
By contrast, contributions to a cultural commons may not be
amenable to objective measurement; only subjective judgment can de-
cide, for example, whether scholarship is worthy of tenure, whether a
Listserve member is excessively requesting others' expertise for mat-
ters the member easily could research himself or herself, or whether a
co-author is contributing substance or mere verbiage. Subjectivity
raises- its own special issues of measurement and reliability. In addi-
tion, as the CCCE authors point out, beneficial spillovers into new
populations cause additional problems of measurement.72
Moreover, in creative domains where work often brings its own
intrinsic satisfaction, typical carrots and sticks may not work as in-
tended. Additionally, much creative work is done alone; monitoring
may create privacy problems and resentment that interferes with suc-
cess. Even a minimal bureaucracy can interfere with the success of a
commons if the commons members hate bureaucracies (as many art-
ists are reputed to do).73 For such reasons, special attention needs to
be devoted to pairing sanctions with appropriate circumstances in the
cultural domain.
71 See generally OSTROM, supra note 18, at 204-05 (using examples to discuss the moni-
toring of rules and their enforcement).
72 Cf Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 13, at 706-07 (discussing the
spillovers" enabled by commons).
73 See generally Gordon, Render Copyright, supra note 59, at 92 (examining persons
whose "creative fuel would be dampened by requiting them to seek advance permissions").
Permissions (presumably not required inside a common) are not the only form of bureau-
cracy that can dampen creative enthusiasm.
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In addition, both positive and negative sanctions can backfire
when creative endeavors are concerned. For example, the threat of
low-effort contributors being punished can be counterproductive for
persons who have a choice of how much effort to invest74 (and how
creative that effort will be). Similarly, although rewards typically are
thought to encourage effort, sometimes rewards can diminish intrin-
sic motivation and, in the process, might degrade the creativity of75 or
the effort invested in 76 resulting works. So sanctions in the case of
knowledge commons-where so much depends on the members' will-
ingness to embrace contribution withjoy and playfulness77-need spe-
cial care in their formation. We can see an example of
underemphasizing the difficulty of sanction questions by looking at
the CCCE authors' own case study of the university.
74 See Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 64, at C22-23 (noting that "it is... possible that
explicit incentives may cause a hostile atmosphere of threat and distrust, which reduces
any reciprocity-based extra effort" and recounting an experiment that documents "explicit
incentives" having negative effects); see also Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Founda-
tions of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. REv. 687, 703 (2002) ("If the principal informs the agent
[ex ante] that he is committed to punish the agent in case of shirking, the principal in-
troduces hostility into the relationship with the agent. This explicit threat of punishment
conveys the message that the principal treats the agent as a potential cheater, which is
likely to be considered as an offence by those who are willing to cooperate voluntarily."
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 703-04 (discussing that punishments that are available only ex
post may have a different effect than punishments threatened ex ante); Daphna Lewinsohn-
Zamir, Identifying Intense Preferences, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1391, 1443 n.253 (2009) ("[W]hen
a technique for identifying intense preferences conspicuously treats individuals as proba-
ble liars, it signals that dishonesty is the norm and truthfulness is for suckers.").
75 See TERESA M. AmABILE, CREATIVTY IN CONTEXT: UPDATE TO The Social Psychology of
Creativity 149-60 (1996) (documenting experiments showing that children who received
awards for their drawings produced lower-quality drawings than children who did not re-
ceive awards for their drawings). For a well-written popular account of the dangers of
explicit rewards, see generally ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED BY REWARDS: THE TROUBLE WITH
GOLD STARS, INCENTIWE PLANS, A's, PRAISE, AND OTHER BRIBES (1993).
76 Many of the tasks involved in knowledge creation generate their own rewards in
forms such as satisfaction or enjoyment, known as "intrinsic motivation." A fairly extensive
social psychology literature claims "that the introduction of monetary rewards decreases
task-specific intrinsic motivation under identifiable conditions." See Fehr & Falk, supra
note 74, at 714. Fehr and Armin Falk investigate the literature and argue that "economists
have ... ample reason to take the possibility of crowding out of intrinsic motivation seri-
ously," but they raise some criticisms and avenues for investigation. See id. at 716-20.
In addition, it is possible that being rewarded for "normal" or "good" behavior may
inculcate a belief that normal cooperation is supererogatory and thus discourage us from
engaging voluntarily in that behavior. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits:
Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 457 (1992) (asserting that
payment for harm avoidance could encourage moral people to infer that they have no
moral obligation to do right unless paid).
77 See David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of
Authorship in the Post-literate Millennium, LAw & CONTEMP. PRORS., Spring 1992, at 139, 151
(celebrating "authorship in the form of creative play"). See generally HYDE, supra note 6
(promoting the importance of reciprocity and gratitude in gift giving).
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THE UNIVERSITY AS A CASE STUDY
Although the CCCE article admits the importance of studying
governance and sanctions, this Response has suggested that the CCCE
article leaves that particular task underanalyzed. To illustrate the im-
portance of putting more emphasis on the issue, the following discus-
sion considers the CCCE authors' case study on the university.78 In my
view, that case study too casually takes an optimistic approach to the
question of sanctions. 79
The public at large can use fruitfully the information a university
yields. But there are some university resources (such as the services of
reference librarians) that cannot be shared so widely. How are these
resources to be allocated? Nonmonetary rewards are also highly com-
plex. Everyday experience amply proves that university-commons
members indeed value reward in the form of credit. Yet we also know
that there are norms that pull in the other direction-such as the
desire to be seen as impartially and unselfishly engaged in the pursuit
of truth-that complicate the mechanism. The classic discussion is
probably Merton's suggestion that the desires for both credit and a
reputation for disinterested scientific dedication create so strong a
conflict that a kind of neurosis can arise.80
78 Note that universities are formally firms, albeit usually nonprofit firms. Perhaps
the CCCE authors put the university in the category of "constructed commons" rather than
"firms" because of the significant degree of faculty governance and the ways in which uni-
versities cross firm boundaries to depend on each others' resources (e.g., for peer review of
journal articles and for tenure). The ambiguous position of universities (between firms
and commons) suggests both the need for further definition in the CCCE article and the
potential relevance to the commons project of extant literature on intrafirm production
and governance.
79 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, University as Commons, supra note 8, at 397:
For full-time faculty appointees, the standard and classic commons govern-
ance mechanisms are tenure, which in theory fully enables open and inde-
pendent research and scholarship without fear of employer retribution,
and the related obligation to conduct research and to publish scholarship.
The latter is the primary resource contribution mechanism in university
commons. It serves as a formal antecedent of tenure and promotion poli-
cies, since virtually every university discipline makes tenure and promotion
dependent on scholarly distinction. The sanction for lack of publication
before tenure is typically loss of appointment and loss of access to the uni-
versity commons. (There is ordinarily no corresponding concept of exces-
sive appropriation of resources from the university.) The obligation to
publish also serves as an informal, norm-based sorting mechanism, which
both directly and indirectly structures governance institutions. More pro-
lific and more influential publication is positively associated with higher
status in the discipline and in university commons: chairs, deanships and
other senior administrative appointments, and related positions that com-
mand additional resources and authority within the university. Publication
is also a critical determinant of access to resources for ongoing research.
80 See MERTON, supra note 7, at 286.
In a recent talk, philosopher Alex Oliver intriguingly pointed out how confused or
rough definitions of plagiarism tend to be. See Alex Oliver, Faculty of Philosophy, Address
at University of London Philosophy and Intellectual Property Conference: What's Wrong
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Given such complications, how does the university allocate re-
wards and punishments to keep the knowledge-generation commons
alive?
The university has several devices for safeguarding the appropri-
ate distribution of credit, as the CCCE article notes, 81 but some of
these devices are decaying. For example, in many disciplines, the refe-
ree system for peer-journal publication tries to operate in a double-
blind manner: the scholar submitting the paper does not know the
identity of the referee, and the referee does not know the identity of
the author. Today, with the Social Science Research Network and
other means of digital distribution of draft papers, referees increas-
ingly often do know the author of an individual piece of writing. This
lack of anonymity means that friendship and enmity-and prejudicial
assumptions about groups82-can play larger roles in the crucial
arena of awarding prestigious journal placements.
with Plagiarism? (May 30, 2009). The Mertonian neurosis may explain why people so often
offer definitions for "plagiarism" that they could easily refine but which they nevertheless
offer in rough form. That is, if everyone in the scholarly world feels anxiety about the issue
of giving and receiving credit, and if anxiety impedes clarity of thought, mangled defini-
tions are arguably a result.
Merton argued that the struggle among scientists for credit was understudied-and
that even the existence of multiple independent inventions was understated, denied, or
ignored-precisely because of such anxiety. As he explains, "Freud himself reports, with
characteristic self-awareness, that he even dreamt about priority and the due allocation of
credit for accomplishment." MERTON, supra note 7, at 386. A similar anxiety may be weak-
ening definitional efforts to pin down the meaning of "plagiarism."
There are many reasons to be anxious about plagiarism. I think many academics are a
bit afraid of unconscious copying in everything they write. And when an academic is
plagiarized or undercited by a colleague, it is hard for the victim of misattribution to know
what to do that will not make him look ungracious. As for Merton, he thinks the struggle
for credit puts scientists at war with their most cherished values. That is, the scientists want
to believe that they put science first-that the progress of science is everything and ego is
nothing. But of course the ego is always something. So scientists pretend not to struggle
over credit even while doing it.
81 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 13, at 701.
82 A case study on universities should examine empirical data on bias. For example,
although the CCCE authors note the importance to university awards of producing "influ-
ential" articles, Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, University as Commons, supra note 8, at
397, influence can be the result of factors other than quality. See, e.g., Christine Wenner.s
& Agnes Wold, Nepotism and Sexism in Peer-Review, 387 NATURE 341, 343 (1997) (arguing
for a development of peer-review systems with resistance against "the effects of prejudice
and comradeship").
One persistent argument in favor of double-blind reviewing involves the possibility
that papers with female-sounding first names are reviewed less favorably than other papers.
One recent study found that after the introduction of double-blind reviewing, a journal
significantly increased its acceptance of papers authored by persons with female-sounding
first names. See Amber E. Budden et al., Double-Blind Review Favours Increased Representation
of Female Authors, 23 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 4, 6 (2008). This study was subject to
criticism, Thomas J. Webb et al., Does Double-Blind Review Benefit Female Authors?, 23 TRENDS
ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 351, 351-52 (2008), and the criticism later was subject to rebuttal,
Amber E. Budden et al., Response to Webb et al.: Double-Blind Review: Accept With Minor Revi-
sions, 23 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 353, 353-54 (2008). For a review of the contro-
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One potential source of bias is personal fondness. People who
like commons tend to be people who expect reciprocity from others.
As David Hume pointed out,8 3 and as Fehr's experiments demon-
strate, it is the expectation that others will respect our "stuff' that
often motivates us to respect their "stuff." 84 This expectation, along
with other factors, may give rise to a fondness for others that could
erode many of the disciplining functions within the knowledge com-
mons of the university. For example, in reviewing the work of others,
tact may obscure communication.
The university as a commons has interesting devices to combat
the fondness factor; most notably, the university as a whole can over-
turn a department's recommendation of tenure. It is thought that the
university committee does not know and love the individual candidate
the way the department does and thus can be more objective.
Yet I suspect that university oversight works better to detect false
positives than false negatives, and false negatives pose real dangers-
fondness is only occasionally dominant. It still could happen that a
department could deny tenure to someone because of the person's
race, gender, 5 political opinions, lifestyle, or some other feature that
versy, see Leif Engqvist & Joachim G. Frommen, Double-Blind Peer Review and Gender
Publication Bias, 76 ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR (F. ARTICLE) El, El-2 (2008) (arguing it is "prema-
ture to conclude" that double-blind reviewing aids females but "not refut[ing] the fact that
review behaviour can be affected by the gender of the author").
Some classic early experiments show lower evaluations given to some articles when
supposedly authored by females as compared to how the same articles were evaluated with
male names attached. See, e.g., Marla Beth Isaacs, Sex Role Stereotyping and the Evaluation of
the Performance of Women: Changing Trends, 6 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 187, 187 (1981); Michele
A. Paludi & William D. Bauer, Goldberg Revisited: What's in an Author's Name, 9 SEx ROLES
387, 387 (1983). Does such bias persist either for women or for other groups? A case study
investigating the knowledge commons as mediated by reputational rewards should devote
significant attention to such issues.
83 See HUME, supra note 67 ("I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another
in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me."
(emphasis omitted)).
84 Fehr and Urs Fischbacher sketch an experiment where A and B are each given ten
pounds. Both must decide either to keep the money or to transfer it to the other. If the
money is transferred, the recipient receives thirty pounds. The decisions to transfer must
be made simultaneously. If people were solely motivated by monetary self-interest, we
would expect that both A and B would keep the ten pounds. However, experimental evi-
dence shows that even in one-shot play, many subjects chose to transfer the ten pounds
even though they had no assurance of receiving anything from the other party. Addition-
ally, "[i]f both subjects are reciprocators and if A believes that B will cooperate ([i.e.]
transfer the money), A prefers to cooperate." See Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 64, at
C13-14 (discussing experiments similar to ones described in Robyn M. Dawes & Richard
H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1988, at 187, 188-90).
85 See supra note 82. Some research suggests that attaching a female name to an arti-
cle can lower a reviewer's evaluation of the article, but these results are controversial. For
some of the early studies raising this observation, see, for example, Paludi & Bauer, supra
note 82, at 390. Michele Paludi and William Bauer asked "360 college students (180 male,
180 female) ... to evaluate an article... in the field of politics, the psychology of women,
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lacks any sensible connection to knowledge creation. And we all know
that universities have both physical and digital walls. When someone
is tossed out of the tenure track by arbitrary criteria, the whole knowl-
edge commons suffers, but the excluded person suffers the most.
Case studies like the CCCE article on universities must investigate
these issues empirically and closely. It is the false negative that most
clearly implicates the sap factor; the more that young scholars fear
that their contributions to the field will go unappreciated or that they
will be exiled from the field that makes use of their knowledge, the
less likely they are to choose to participate in this particular con-
structed commons.
What disciplines these false negatives? It is my guess that antidis-
crimination suits8 6 and the like are hardly sufficient. Irrational aver-
sions are everywhere, and if the university knowledge commons is to
work well, a detailed study of how to control these aversions is
required.
Politics plays a role, too. In a world where our prospects for jobs,
grants, prestige, "bully pulpits," and first-class research-library re-
sources all depend on how others think of us-and where today's
newbie is tomorrow's star-kindness may become ever more the norm
along with deference to the currently powerful. It is commonly ar-
gued that citations ordinarily go to the famous author rather than to
all other equally entitled authors.8 7 A case study should examine such
or education" that were denoted, respectively, masculine, feminine, or neutral. Id. at 388.
Paludi and Bauer found that
[t]he masculine, neutral, and feminine articles were rated more favorably
when supposedly written by a male rather than by the other two authors.
Each of the three articles was rated least favorably when it was supposedly
written by a female author. Finally, men rating the male author gave the
highest evaluation of all. In addition, men assigned the feminine article
the least favorable rating when it was supposedly written by a female.
Id. at 389. Interestingly, the study also showed that "the author with the sexually ambigu-
ous name was preferred over the female, but not over the male, author." Id. An experi-
ment by Maria Beth Isaacs showed that women who had not achieved status sometimes
were devalued in relation to men, but women who had achieved status were not devalued.
See Isaacs, supra note 82, at 193-94. Isaacs finds this encouraging, but argues that if
the work of women is devalued by men (usually the people in the position
ofjudging the works of women in masculine areas), then it becomes all the
more difficult for women to prove their competence since their work may
not be judged fairly. Even work that is equivalent to the work of a man will
be judged inferior until it receives special distinction. That distinction,
however, is difficult to achieve when the work is originally judged in a bi-
ased manner. Thus, women in certain fields may not be able to expect
unbiased evaluations until they prove themselves by some obvious sign of
success.
Id. at 194.
86 The CCCE authors mention discrimination suits but do not examine their efficacy.
See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, University as Commons, supra note 8, at 398.
87 See Robert K Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science, 159 SCIENCE 56, 56-63 (1968)
(discussing co-author citation).
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arguments in depth along with the possibility of the converse (i.e.,
hypercritical evaluations of colleagues' and forerunners' work). In
academia, where the players are also judges with wide discretion, the
study of reward allocation needs special sensitivity to such sociological
considerations.
If I am right that scholars use kindness in judging each other, my
guess is that this observation is a good thing rather than a bad thing.
A perception that one is appreciated may be the best encouragement
for more work. Nevertheless, it is clear that such a phenomenon
needs investigation-as do the potential loss of the double-blind sys-
tem in refereeing and the error cost of false negatives in the tenure
process. It would also be interesting to interrogate the university's use
of a drastic sanction (tenure denial) as compared with the "graduated
sanctions" recommended by Ostrom. 88 Such inquiries need more in-
vestigation than they were given in the CCCE authors' analysis of
universities.
CONCLUSION
The CCCE authors rightly point to the importance of narrative
and history in trying to understand a given commons.89 Part of the
western narrative is John Locke's writing on property and govern-
ment. In trying to argue against the divine right of kings, Locke wrote
that instead of giving the earth to a particular royal line, "God. .. has
given the earth to the children of men, given it to mankind in com-
mon."90 Defending that starting point in the "common" was impor-
tant for Locke's argument that government should serve the people.
The word "commons" thus has a special resonance in political theory,
embedding itself in connotations of equality and inclusiveness.
By contrast, a "constructed commons" might not treat all people
the same and might not include everyone. This point is implicit in
the notions of governance and sanctions, which ordinarily imply re-
wards, punishments, and boundaries. Part of this Response's concern
is with the need to be sure that constructed commons do not improp-
erly exclude or reject members of outsider groups. Most fundamen-
tally, this Response argues that studies of constructed commons must
place emphasis on how and when to mete out rewards and punish-
ments, who to include or exclude from boundaries, and how to struc-
88 See OSTROM, supra note 18, at 94-99 (discussing graduated sanctions). Of course,
the university also uses sanctions that are less drastic than the denial of tenure, but the role
of the "up or out" system has great salience.
89 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 13, at 698-99.
90 JOHN LocKE, The Second Treatise of Government 16 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., The
Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690) (quotation omitted).
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ture the gaps in boundary lines given the subtle and difficult questions
that must be resolved in order to manage cultural incentives well.
It is important to remember that the commons has many varia-
tions. It might be tempting to distinguish between the regulated com-
mons that are the focus of the CCCE article and the commons we
know as the public domain on the ground that the latter is unregu-
lated. But even the public domain has rules governing what content
enters the public domain and how people can use it. It can be crucial
how that domain functions,91 both within itself and along its bounda-
ries, with cultural products that are "owned" either privately or by a
constructed-common group. Our mixed-property regimes must take
the importance of the public domain into account.
91 Jessica Litman has led us to be more conscious of how the public domain is essen-
tial for the creation of new work. SeeJessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY LJ. 965,
968-69 (1990).
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